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School Discipline 101:  
Students’ Due Process Rights 
in Expulsion Hearings
By Melissa Frydman and Shani King
U
pholding the principle that school districts, as state actors, shall not deprive a 
student of liberty or property without due process of law, courts have expanded 
for more than four decades the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process 
protection of public school students. Understanding this principle is essential to 
representing children in school discipline proceedings. Before presenting a practical 
guide to representing students in these proceedings, we offer a brief history of due 
process protection for children.
I . Before Goss v. Lopez: 1954–1975
The history of due process standards in school discipline proceedings probably 
begins with the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which says, inter 
alia: “No state shall … deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law.”1 In 1954 in Bolling v. Sharpe, a companion case to Brown v. Board of 
Education, the U.S. Supreme Court construed the word “liberty” to encompass a 
child’s right to a public education.2 Bolling was a class action brought on behalf of 
eleven black students who challenged segregation in the public schools of the District 
of Columbia. In ruling for the plaintiffs the Court, led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, 
relied on the guarantee of liberty in the due process clause to recognize that the con-
cept of liberty encompasses a child’s right to a public education.3
Notwithstanding Bolling, before 1961 due process played a “negligible role in school 
and college discipline” proceedings.4 This near absence of due process protection 
began to change that year when the Fifth Circuit decided Dixon v. Alabama State Board 
of Education.5 The plaintiffs in Dixon were African American students (all at Alabama 
State College) who engaged in various acts of civil disobedience to challenge legal seg-
regation. Heeding an explicit request from Alabama’s governor, the state summarily 
expelled six of the students without notice or hearing. In response, the students, alleg-
ing that they had been denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
sought injunctive relief in federal court.
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1u.S. coNSt. amend. XIV, § 1.
2Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3Bolling, 347 U.S. at 497. (While the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause because 
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to states, not to the District of Columbia, the same due process standard is widely 
understood to apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.)
4William G. Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 uNiveRSity of 
peNNSylvaNia law Review 545, 552 (1971).
5Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
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Due process requires, the Fifth Circuit 
held in ruling for the plaintiffs, notice 
and some opportunity for a hearing 
before students at a public college may be 
expelled for misconduct. Judge Richard 
Rives reasoned:
The precise nature of the private 
interest involved in this case is 
the right to remain at a pub-
lic institution of higher learn-
ing in which the plaintiffs were 
students in good standing. It 
requires no argument to demon-
strate that education is vital, and 
indeed, basic to civilized society. 
Without sufficient education the 
plaintiffs would not be able to 
earn an adequate livelihood, to 
enjoy life to the fullest, or to 
fulfill as completely as possible 
the duties and responsibilities 
of good citizens. There was no 
offer to prove that other colleges 
are open to the plaintiffs. If so, 
the plaintiffs would nonetheless 
be injured by the interruption of 
their course of studies in mid-
term…. Indeed, expulsion may 
well prejudice the student in 
completing his education at any 
other institution.6
The court in Dixon further opined that the 
example the Alabama Board of Education 
set could have “broken the spirits of the 
expelled students and of others familiar 
with injustice” and that “it is shocking 
that the officials of a state educational 
institution, which can function prop-
erly only if our freedoms are preserved, 
should not understand the elementary 
principles of fair play.”7 While binding 
only in the Fifth Circuit, Dixon set a 
precedent that notice and a hearing must 
precede expulsion from public colleges 
and universities, and the decision set in 
motion a domino effect of policy change 
at institutions of higher learning.8
Only six years later, in 1967, the Supreme 
Court decided In re Gault and revolu-
tionized due process protection in juve-
nile court proceedings.9 In Gault the 
Court continued to lay a foundation for 
explicit recognition of the due process 
rights of school-age children under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
Fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault lived in 
Arizona and was charged with making 
lewd phone calls.10 After being found 
delinquent in juvenile court, Gerald was 
sentenced to reform school until he was 
21 years old, even though the maximum 
sentence an adult would have received 
for the same offense was a $50 fine or 
imprisonment of not more than two 
months.11 Gerald and his parents had no 
right to appeal the juvenile case under 
Arizona law; instead Gerald filed a writ of 
habeas corpus with the Arizona Supreme 
Court and subsequently appealed to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, where he argued 
that he had been denied due process of 
law at trial.12
Writing for the Court, Justice Fortas 
stated that “neither the Fourteenth 
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for 
adults alone.”13 The Court reversed the 
juvenile court’s finding of delinquency 
and held that a minor was entitled to 
the following procedural protections in 
a juvenile delinquency proceeding: (1) 
specific and timely notice of the charges, 
School Discipline 101: Students’ Due Process Rights in Expulsion Hearings
6Id. at 157.
7Id. at 157–58.
8Student Procedural Due Process 2006, commoNwealth eDucatioNal policy iNStitute eDucatioN law NewSletteR (Commonw. Educ. 
Pol’y Inst., Va. Commonw. Univ., Richmond, Va.), Feb. 2006, at cepionline.org.
9In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 558.
10Gault. 387 U.S. at 7–8.
11Id.; Buss, supra note 4, at 557.
12Gault, 387 U.S. at 10.
13Id. at 14.
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(2) legal counsel, (3) protection from 
self-incrimination, and (4) confronta-
tion and cross-examination of adverse 
witnesses.14 While In re Gault was limited 
to juvenile delinquency proceedings, it 
continued to lay a foundation for what 
was to come in the late 1960s and 1970s 
in cases involving minors.15
In 1969 the Supreme Court decided the 
landmark case of Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District.16 
In Tinker parents sued the school district 
on behalf of their children to obtain an 
injunction against enforcement of a reg-
ulation that prohibited students, while 
on school grounds, from wearing black 
armbands to protest the Vietnam war.17 
The petitioners alleged, inter alia, that 
enforcement of the policy violated the 
students’ rights to free speech and free-
dom of expression under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.
Justice Fortas’s majority opinion in Tinker 
began with the now oft-repeated “It can 
hardly be argued that either students or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights 
to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”18 The Court then held 
that, absent a finding that the armbands 
would “substantially interfere with the 
work of the school” or “impinge upon 
the rights of other students,” the policy 
prohibiting black armbands violated the 
students’ constitutional rights to free-
dom of speech and expression.19 In so 
holding, the Court borrowed language 
from Justice Brennan in an earlier case: 
“The vigilant protection of constitutional 
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in 
the community of American schools.”20
II . Procedural Due Process in  
Public Schools
More than two decades after Bolling 
established education as a liberty inter-
est that the due process clause protect-
ed, the Supreme Court addressed the 
procedural due process rights of public 
school students in Goss v. Lopez.21 The 
Ohio public school students who brought 
that class action lawsuit argued that their 
suspension from high school without a 
hearing of any kind violated their due 
process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The students sought (1) a 
declaration that the Ohio law granting 
authority for the suspension was uncon-
stitutional, (2) an injunction against 
future suspension pursuant to this law, 
and (3) removal of any reference in their 
records to suspension instituted pursu-
ant to this law. The law, Ohio Revised 
Code Annotated § 3313.64, empowered 
a principal to suspend a student for mis-
conduct for up to ten days, provided that 
the principal notified the student’s par-
ents within twenty-four hours and stated 
the reasons for the suspension.22
A student’s attendance at public 
school, the Court said in an opinion by 
Justice White, is a property right that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects. The 
Court reasoned (1) that “protected prop-
erty interests are normally ‘not created 
by the constitution. Rather, they are cre-
ated and their dimensions are defined’ 
by an independent source such as state 
statutes or rules entitling the citizen to 
certain benefits,” and (2) that Ohio’s 
compulsory attendance statute granted 
all Ohio children between the ages of 
14Id.
15Student Procedural Due Process 2006, supra note 8.
16Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
17Id. at 504.
18Id. at 506.
19Id. at 508.
20Id. at 512 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
21Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
22Id. at 567.
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5 and 21 a “legitimate claim of entitle-
ment to a public education.”23 Justice 
White explained that “having chosen 
to extend the right to an education … 
Ohio may not withdraw that right on 
grounds of misconduct, absent funda-
mentally fair procedures to determine 
whether the misconduct has occurred.”24 
The Court emphasized that the state had 
broad authority to prescribe and enforce 
conduct in its schools but that the state 
must exercise its authority to constrain a 
student’s property right to education in 
accordance with the Constitution.
Then, in keeping with the historical view 
of the right to an education as a lib-
erty interest, the Court reasoned that the 
application of the Ohio law also collided 
with the students’ liberty interests:
The Due Process Clause also 
forbids arbitrary deprivations 
of liberty. “Where a person’s 
good name, reputation, honor, 
or integrity is at stake because 
of what the government is doing 
to him,” the minimal require-
ments of the Clause must be 
satisfied. [Citations omitted]. 
School authorities here sus-
pended appellees for periods of 
up to 10 days based on charges 
of misconduct. If sustained and 
recorded, those charges could 
seriously damage the students’ 
standing with their fellow pupils 
and their teachers as well as 
interfere with later opportuni-
ties for higher education and 
employment. It is apparent that 
the claimed right of the State 
to determine unilaterally and 
without process whether that 
misconduct has occurred imme-
diately collides with the require-
ments of the Constitution.25
The Goss Court, having recognized the 
property and liberty interests implicated 
in depriving a student of an educational 
placement, then held that “at the very 
minimum, students facing suspension 
and the consequent interference with 
a protected property interest must be 
given some kind of notice and some kind 
of hearing.”26 The Court further held that 
“due process requires, in connection with 
a suspension of 10 days or less, that the 
student be given oral or written notice of 
the charges against him and, if he denies 
them, an explanation of the evidence the 
authorities have and an opportunity to 
present his side of the story.”27
While Goss established a new property 
right and additional protection for stu-
dents, the Court predictably refused to 
articulate an inflexible procedure under 
the due process clause because the nature 
of the new right’s application made it 
impossible to create procedures that 
would fit every situation.28 And, although 
Goss did not involve expulsions per se, 
the Court opined that “longer suspen-
sions or expulsions for the remainder 
of the school term, or permanently, may 
require more formal procedures,” leav-
ing the door open for courts to imple-
ment more formal Gault-like require-
ments in cases of longer suspension and 
expulsion.29
III . Clarification and Application
Since 1975, courts have clarified and 
applied the Goss requirements. For 
example, in Gonzales v. McEuen, when 
23Id. at 573 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
24Id. at 574.
25Id. at 574–75.
26Id. at 579.
27Id. at 581. Regarding the timing of this notice, the Court explained that “there need be no delay between the time 
notice is given and the time of the hearing. In the great majority of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the 
alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred. We hold only that, in being given an opportunity to 
explain his version of the facts at this discussion, the student first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis 
of the accusation is…. [I]t follows that as a general rule notice and hearing should precede removal of the student from 
school.” Id. at 582.
28Id. at 578.
29Id. at 584.
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students in California challenged their 
expulsion as violating due process, 
the district court noted that “it is now 
beyond argument that due process pro-
tections apply to expulsion of students 
by public educational institutions.”30 
The Gonzales court further clarified Goss’ 
application in expulsion hearings: “Goss 
clearly anticipates that where the stu-
dent is faced with the severe penalty of 
expulsion he shall have the right to be 
represented by and through counsel, to 
present evidence on his own behalf, and 
to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses.”31
More recently, courts interpreting Goss 
have relied on the statutory law of their 
own jurisdictions to elucidate due pro-
cess requirements where Goss is (argu-
ably) silent. For example, in D.F. v. Board 
of Education, a federal district court in 
New York quoted Goss in recognizing that 
“a student has a protected property inter-
est in education ‘which may not be taken 
away for misconduct without adherence 
to the minimum procedures required 
by the due process clause.’”32 However, 
the court turned to the state’s own statu-
tory framework to articulate students’ 
due process rights in noting that “New 
York Education Law provides for certain, 
basic procedural protections for suspen-
sions longer than (5) days … such … [as] 
… ‘representation by counsel, with the 
right to question witnesses against such 
pupil and to present witnesses and other 
evidence on his behalf.’”33
The history of due process demonstrates 
an evolving concept that forms the core 
of the constitutional protections avail-
able to students. Due process is also the 
foundation for the laws, regulations, and 
policies upon which advocates rely in 
representing students in school disci-
pline proceedings.
IV . A Practical Guide to  
Representing Students
With this historical perspective, we now 
turn to a practical approach to suspen-
sion and expulsion cases.
A . State and Local Laws  
and Regulations
The first step in developing a school 
discipline practice is to review thor-
oughly your state’s laws and regulations 
governing the suspension and expul-
sion of students.34 One positive aspect 
of representing students in expulsion 
hearings is that the law in this area is 
relatively basic, allowing for easier mas-
tery. In California, with rather lengthy 
30Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 466 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
31Id. at 467. Other courts require a hearing incorporating these safeguards before or shortly after a child is suspended 
for a prolonged or indefinite period. See Black Coalition v. Portland School District, No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 
1973); Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967). As for the timing of the Goss hearing, 
a federal district court in Virginia held that a right to hearing meant a “prompt hearing”; the court found that a hearing 
held thirty days after a student was suspended was not prompt and was therefore impermissible under Goss. See Doe v. 
Rockingham County, 658 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Va. 1987).
32D.F. v. Board of Education, 386 F. Supp. 2d 119, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Goss, 419 U.S. at 574).
33Id.
34ala. coDe § 16-1-14 (2006); alaSKa aDmiN. coDe tit. 4, § 07.010 (2006); aRiz. Rev. Stat. aNN. § 15-840 (2006); aRK. coDe 
aNN. § 6-18-500 (2006); cal. eDuc. coDe §§ 48900-48927 (weSt 2006); colo. Rev. Stat. aNN. § 22-32-109.1 (West 2006); 
coNN. geN. Stat. aNN. § 10-233 (West 2006); Del. coDe aNN. tit. 14, § 1601 (2006); fla. Stat. aNN. § 1002 (West 2006); ga. 
coDe aNN. § 20-2-730-769 (West 2006); haw. Rev. Stat. § 8-19 (2006); iDaho aDmiN. coDe r. 08.02.03-160 (2006); ill. comp. 
Stat. aNN. 105 5/10-22.6 (West 2006); iND. coDe aNN. § 20-33-8 (West 2006); iowa coDe aNN. § 282.4 (West 2006); KaN. 
Stat. aNN. § 72-8900 (2006); Ky. Rev. Stat. aNN. § 158.150 (as amended by 2006 Ky. lawS ch. 139 (hb 688)); la. Rev. Stat. 
aNN. § 17:416 (2006); me. Rev. Stat. aNN. tit. 20-A, § 1001 (2006); mD. coDe aNN., eDuc. § 7-305 (West 2006); maSS. geN. 
lawS ch. 71, § 37h (2006); mich. comp. lawS aNN. § 380.1311 (West 2006); miNN. Stat. aNN. § 121a (West 2006); miSS. 
coDe aNN. § 71-37 (2006); mo. Rev. Stat § 160.261 (2006); moNt. coDe aNN. § 20-5-202 (2006); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-268 
(2006); Nev. Rev. Stat. aNN. § 392.4655 (West 2006); N.h. Rev. Stat. aNN. § 193:13 (2006); N.J. Stat. aNN. § 18a:37-2 (West 
2006); N.m. Stat. aNN. § 22-5-4.3 (West 2006); N.y. eDuc. law § 3214 (McKinney 2005); N.c. geN. Stat. aNN. § 115c-391 
(West 2006); N.D. ceNt. coDe § 15.1-19-09 (2006); ohio Rev. coDe aNN. § 3313.66 (West 2006); oKla. Stat. aNN. tit. 70, 
§ 24-101.3 (West 2006); oR. Rev. Stat. aNN. §339.240 (West 2006); 24 pa. coNS. Stat. aNN. § 13-1318 (West 2006); R.i. 
geN. lawS § 16-2-17 (2006); S.c. coDe aNN. § 59-63-210 (2006); S.D. coDifieD lawS § 13-32-4 (2006); teNN. coDe aNN. § 
49-6-3401 (West 2006); tex. eDuc. coDe aNN. § 37.007 (Vernon 2005); utah coDe aNN. § 53a-11-903 (West 2006); vt. Stat. 
aNN. tit. 16, § 1162 (2006); va. coDe aNN. § 22.1-277 (West 2006); waSh. Rev. coDe aNN. § 28a.305.160 (West 2006); w. 
va. coDe aNN. § 18a-5-1 (West 2006); wiS. Stat. aNN. § 119.25 (West 2006); wyo. Stat. aNN. § 21-4-305 (2006).
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and detailed regulations, our entire leg-
islative scheme governing these hear-
ings is no more than twenty-six pages.35 
Further, only some fifteen reported cases 
in California address and elucidate school 
discipline issues. You should review any 
regulations governing school discipline 
matters in the individual district where 
you represent a student. Many states give 
districts great discretion in establish-
ing disciplinary policies and procedures. 
Local regulations may offer more infor-
mation than state statutes.
Review your state regulations and case 
law and any local provisions to give you 
a framework of students’ due process 
rights and a sense of the kinds of offenses 
for which students may face suspension 
or expulsion. These generally range from 
the innocuous and vague (e.g., disrupt-
ing school activities) to the serious and 
specific (e.g., possession of a gun).36 
Equally important, however, you must 
have a clear notion about acts for which 
students may not be expelled. Pay par-
ticular attention to where and when the 
alleged offenses took place. Some states 
require that to be grounds for expulsion 
a student’s offense must have occurred at 
school or at a school-sponsored activity. 
Others cover anything that occurs on the 
way to or from school. Still others allow 
expulsion for offenses that have seem-
ingly nothing to do with school.37 States 
sometimes specifically exclude a class of 
offenses as grounds for expulsion (e.g. 
tardiness or truancy).38 Begin by grasp-
ing the boundaries of your state and local 
laws and exploring the universe of acts 
that can lead to expulsion hearings.
B . Suspension Policies  
and Procedures
Once a student is alleged to have com-
mitted an expellable offense, the student 
is likely as a first step to be suspended for 
a short period (e.g., one to ten days).39 
Again, review state law to determine the 
permissible length of suspension. Short-
term suspensions that precede expulsion 
attempts are frequently extended until 
the expulsion hearing is held. A basic 
level of due process—usually consisting 
of a meeting between student and par-
ent and school officials to explain the 
circumstances leading to the suspen-
sion and the need for ongoing suspen-
sion pending further hearing—typically 
accompanies any such extensions.40 
Allowing for some minimal due process 
and an opportunity to be heard gives 
schools legal grounds to lengthen the 
suspension prior to holding an actual 
disciplinary hearing with more extensive 
due process rights. How long students 
may be excluded from school before an 
expulsion hearing varies from state to 
state, but the period may extend up to 
thirty consecutive school days.
These extended suspensions themselves 
are a critical area for advocacy. If the 
school did not comply with state law, ask 
that the student be allowed to return to 
school immediately, even pending further 
disciplinary action. A school’s failure to 
meet minimal due process requirements 
for the suspension might also be a use-
ful argument during the expulsion hear-
ing itself. Even if an extended suspen-
sion was properly carried out, advocates 
35cal. eDuc. coDe §§ 48900–48927 (West 2006).
36See id. §§ 48900(k) & (b).
37E.g., Texas has a category of offenses for which students may be expelled only if the offenses happened while on school 
property and other offenses for which students may face expulsion if the offenses occurred within 300 feet of any school 
campus. See tex. eDuc. coDe aNN § 37.007 (Vernon 2005).
38See cal. eDuc. coDe § 48900(v) (West 2006). See also Nev. Rev. Stat. aNN § 392.467(4) (West 2006) (restricts expulsion or 
suspension of truant students).
39California law allows only up to five consecutive days of suspension unless a student is facing expulsion. See cal. eDuc. 
coDe § 48911(a) (West 2006). Cf., e.g., ohio Rev. coDe aNN. § 3313.66(a) (West 2006) (allowing suspensions for up to 
ten consecutive days).
40See, e.g., utah coDe aNN. § 53a-11-905(5)(c) (West 2006).
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should recognize that thirty days is a sig-
nificant portion of the entire school year. 
So that your client does not fall too far 
behind, insist that she be given work that 
allows her to keep up with classes while 
she is kept out. Although procedures vary 
widely, some school systems offer alter-
native educational venues where students 
who are out of school can get some educa-
tion.41 Request those opportunities and 
take advantage of them when offered. 
Not only can they help keep the student 
from falling behind, but also attending 
an alternative program can show, in an 
expulsion hearing, that the student takes 
school seriously and continued her stud-
ies to the extent possible even while she 
was suspended.
C . Gathering Evidence and 
Preparing Your Client
Although a ten- to thirty-day suspen-
sion while awaiting an expulsion hearing 
may seem excessive from the student’s 
perspective, that is a very short time 
for an attorney to prepare for a hear-
ing.42 Once you know you will represent 
a client who faces an expulsion hearing, 
hit the ground running. Gather all the 
documents the school has regarding your 
client—not only those the school will use 
at the hearing but also everything the 
school has about your client’s disciplin-
ary and academic history and any records 
about the incident alleged to be the basis 
for the expulsion. This is your opportu-
nity to conduct discovery. Do not define 
your request so narrowly that you miss 
crucial evidence.
Proper notice is an element of due pro-
cess. While states vary on the exact form 
of notice required, generally notice must 
be in writing and detail the acts that the 
student is accused of committing and 
that make her eligible to be expelled. 
The notice must state the intent to expel 
the student and specify the student’s 
procedural rights, including rights to a 
hearing before an impartial fact finder, 
to be represented by counsel or any non-
attorney advocate, to present witnesses 
and other evidence, to question any evi-
dence and cross-examine any opposing 
witnesses, and to have a recording of the 
hearing itself prepared and written find-
ings developed that support a decision 
based on the evidence presented at the 
hearing.43 Documents that support the 
school’s determination that the student 
committed an expellable offense—nar-
rative descriptions of what the school 
alleges occurred or actual witness state-
ments—usually accompany the notice. 
Narratives of school discipline history, 
statements from teachers about the stu-
dent’s behavior or academic standing, 
and attendance and grade reports are 
also common. The same packet of docu-
ments is usually sent to the student and 
parent and presented to the fact finders 
prior to the hearing itself. In prepar-
ing and presenting your case, you must 
learn about what will already be known or 
assumed about your client. You must ask 
to see your client’s entire school record 
and any documents the school has about 
the incident in question because schools 
commonly give the hearing officer only 
witness statements that support the 
school’s position. The student’s entire 
record can give you access to documents 
or evidence that call into question the 
school’s version of what occurred or that 
support your client’s story.
As you prepare for the hearing, be sure 
to meet with your client to hear her story 
of what took place. Get a detailed account 
not only of the incident but also of who 
might have witnessed it, what your cli-
ent told others about it, and what school 
staff told her. Know your client’s aca-
demic and disciplinary history from her 
41E.g., N.J. Stat. aNN § 18a:37-2.2 (West 2006) (offers some suspended students an “alternative education program”). Cf. 
va. coDe aNN. § 22.1-277.04 (West 2006) (parents must pay for alternative education programs).
42Some jurisdictions allow attorneys to request a continuance of the expulsion hearing in order to prepare more 
adequately. However, typically that request accompanies an agreement that the student’s suspension is extended during 
the continuance period. If a student is allowed to return to school pending an expulsion hearing, more preparation time is 
almost always a good idea. However, if the student continues to miss school, advocates must carefully weigh the value of 
the additional preparation time and the likelihood of success against the loss of instructional time.
43For an example of a state statute that spells out the required notice elements, see wiS. Stat. aNN. § 120.13 (West 
2006).
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perspective and acquaint yourself with 
context about which the school might 
be unaware or might not have consid-
ered in its investigation. Decide with 
your client if you want to bring witnesses 
to the hearing and whom, if anyone, 
you should subpoena. Many states’ laws 
provide for students to subpoena wit-
nesses to testify at expulsion hearings. 
Witnesses not only can present evidence 
about the incident itself but also serve as 
character witnesses. You should explore 
whether people who cannot be present to 
testify may be willing to write letters of 
support. Decide whether your client will 
testify in her own defense and know what 
statements, either oral or written, she 
has already made—a special precaution 
for students who have also been arrested 
or face juvenile delinquency charges for 
the same offenses for which they face 
expulsion. Because anything a minor 
says during an expulsion hearing may be 
used against her later in juvenile court, 
be sure before the hearing to discuss 
the client’s testimony with her public 
defender or other attorney handling any 
delinquency matters.
D . Hearing Officers and Impartiality
Be sure to learn who actually hears the 
case in your jurisdiction. This can vary 
even from district to district within a 
state; fact finders range from single 
individuals, such as superintendents or 
administrative law judges, to panels of 
administrators, to entire school boards. 
Battles have been waged in many states 
over fact finders’ impartiality and who 
has the authority to make a final decision. 
Generally a hearing officer who had no 
role in the actual incident and no control 
over the decision to expel the student is 
deemed fair and impartial.44 However, 
you should review state regulations and 
case law to ensure that whoever hears 
your case meets state mandates. Be sure 
that the fact finders themselves appear 
fair and impartial during the hearing 
and that they consider only what is pre-
sented to them. Because hearing officers 
are so often district officials who have 
close, and frequently personal, relation-
ships with school officials who are pre-
senting the case against your client, be 
attuned to information that might have 
been presented outside the hearing or to 
individuals who might have had access to 
the hearing officers to sway their deci-
sions outside the hearing itself. In some 
states, for example, cases have addressed 
the impartiality of attorneys who simul-
taneously advise the hearing officers and 
help the school present its case against 
the student.45 Watch for evidence of bias 
in decision making and promptly note 
any such evidence on the record.
E . Hearing Format and  
Procedural Considerations
To prepare for the hearing, consult 
someone who has represented clients at 
expulsion hearings in your area. Doing 
so can alert you to nuances of your audi-
ence and how the hearing will be struc-
tured. Hearings vary widely from district 
to district; some are orderly and much 
like minitrials, while others resemble a 
three-ring circus. In either case, remem-
ber that you are making a record for a 
potential appeal. Be sure to make your-
self heard and note any irregularities 
of format or procedure, especially any 
jurisdictional questions. If you believe 
the panel lacks jurisdiction—because the 
incident is not an expellable offense or 
did not occur on school grounds, the 
school did not provide proper or timely 
notice, or even that the hearing itself is 
untimely, for example—note that imme-
diately for the record.
Standards of proof will vary; be familiar 
with what elements the school must prove 
to expel your client. Hearing officers 
often are not attorneys and are unversed 
in legal requirements. A key part of your 
job is to educate them. School officials 
hearing these cases are often swayed by 
inflammatory charges or the student’s 
poor attendance record or academic 
history. Legally, however, these matters 
are irrelevant. Try to keep your hearing 
panel focused only on what the law sets as 
grounds for expulsion.
44See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-269(2) (2006).
45See, e.g., Gonzales, 435 F. Supp. at 463.
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The fundamental issue before the hear-
ing officers will be whether the student 
committed the alleged offenses and, if 
so, what punishment is authorized or 
fitting. State laws vary in the burden the 
school must meet for different offenses. 
For example, California has five “manda-
tory expulsion” (also referred to as “zero 
tolerance”) offenses: possessing a gun, 
brandishing a knife at someone, selling 
drugs, committing a sexual assault, and 
possessing an explosive.46 If the school 
can prove that the student committed 
any one of these, a hearing panel has no 
choice but to expel the student.47 For any 
other offense, the fact finders would also 
need to make a secondary finding that 
no remedy other than expulsion would 
correct the student’s behavior or that 
the student would pose a physical dan-
ger if she were not expelled.48 Review 
your state’s procedures and case law to 
know the nature of the evidence required 
and how to address each element. In 
California, if the student is accused of a 
“mandatory expulsion” offense, attack-
ing evidence that she committed the 
offense at all is essential. With any other 
type of case you can not only attack any 
evidence that the student committed the 
offense but also contend that neither the 
incident nor the student’s history merits 
the extreme punishment of expulsion.49
F . Evidence
Know how your state addresses rules 
of evidence during expulsion hearings. 
Formal rules of evidence typically do 
not apply, but policies vary as to whether 
students may be expelled solely on the 
basis of hearsay, which is often the only 
evidence the school presents. Thus the 
hearsay rules can be a crucial advocacy 
tool. If you can establish that hearsay 
evidence alone is insufficient to support 
a finding against your client, you have a 
strong chance of defeating a school’s case 
on the merits.
The kind of evidence you develop on your 
client’s behalf will inevitably vary wide-
ly with individual circumstances. Even 
if your client undoubtedly committed 
the offense, you can present character 
witnesses and have your client offer an 
apology in her own words, provided that 
doing so does not jeopardize the outcome 
of any delinquency proceedings. Even 
students who have committed expellable 
offenses are entitled to due process, and 
the presence of an advocate who offers 
evidence and tells the student’s story 
can have a major impact on whether the 
student is expelled and the length of 
the expulsion—and thus ultimately on 
the student’s educational future. Suggest 
alternative means of discipline, short of 
expulsion, to demonstrate to the district 
that your client understands the gravity 
of the situation and is willing to address 
the issues. Alternatives might include a 
transfer to another comprehensive school 
within the district, repair of any damage, 
community service, enrollment in anger 
management or counseling programs, or 
anything else that might convince the 
hearing officers that an outcome short of 
expulsion could be effective.
G . Postexpulsion Considerations 
and Appeals
Written findings of fact supported by 
evidence introduced at the hearing typi-
cally must accompany a decision to expel 
the student, and the decision specifies 
the length of expulsion and terms for 
rehabilitation. If your client is expelled, 
you need to know what, if any, edu-
cation services your state requires for 
expelled students. The permissible 
length of expulsions varies widely, and 
during the hearing itself this is often an 
46cal. eDuc. coDe § 48915(c) (West 2006).
47However, the governing school board, which must make the final decision, may impose a “suspended expulsion” as a 
lesser means of punishment. See cal. eDuc. coDe § 48917 (West 2006). A “suspended expulsion” is like probation; the 
student may return to school but faces reinstatement of her expulsion should she violate any school rules during the 
suspended expulsion period.
48See cal. eDuc. coDe § 48915 (West 2006).
49Before even going to hearing you should explore whether a deal akin to a “plea bargain” is possible in the district. E.g., 
the student might admit to an offense and agree to a punishment short of actual expulsion, such as transfer to another 
school or district or a suspended expulsion.
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opportunity for arguing leniency. While 
California caps expulsion at one calendar 
year, some states allow longer periods 
or impose no cap at all.50 Determine 
what will happen if your client’s fam-
ily moves to a new school district during 
the expulsion term. Most states require 
students to notify the new district of 
their expulsion, and typically the expul-
sion follows the student. Students cannot 
evade expulsion simply by starting over 
somewhere new.
Even after a decision to expel has been 
made, attorneys should carefully con-
sider appealing that decision. Even if a 
student comes to you after an expulsion 
hearing at which she was not represented 
by counsel, you may still be able to defeat 
the expulsion order on appeal. Appeal 
procedures also vary widely. You may 
have to exhaust local levels of appeal 
before you can seek reversal in court, 
and you need to review each district’s 
regulations. In California the first level 
of appeal is to the county board of educa-
tion and must be made within thirty days 
of the decision.51 These appeals are not 
rehearings; rather, their primary focus 
is on narrow jurisdictional or abuse-of-
due-process grounds.52 Particularly in 
districts where proper procedures are 
routinely ignored, appeals can be quite 
effective in forcing school districts to 
follow the law.
H . Issues for Further Research  
and Consideration
Although three issues are beyond the 
scope of this overview, advocates should 
consider and further research them: 
disability, racial discrimination, and 
language access. Find out right away 
whether the student you are representing 
receives special education services. The 
Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act especially protects students with dis-
abilities in school discipline matters.53 
Attorneys should also be attuned to dis-
criminatory discipline that treats students 
of one race differently from others and 
consider filing complaints with the U.S. 
Department of Education Office of Civil 
Rights. Students with limited English 
proficiency and their families may have 
special due process needs with regard to 
notice and translation. Consider these 
issues and raise them during the expul-
sion process on a case-by-case basis.
n   n   n
Expulsion hearings and the due pro-
cess rights that shape them—the legacy 
of Goss v. Lopez—are a fundamental aspect 
of our educational system. The stakes in 
these cases are high in that students face 
deprivation of even basic educational 
instruction for anywhere from months to 
years. Although hundreds of thousands of 
expulsion hearings take place every year 
across the country, relatively few attor-
neys or advocates, particularly in low-
income communities of color, take on 
these administrative matters and defend 
students’ rights. As school districts grow 
used to parents’ and students’ failure to 
understand or enforce their rights, these 
districts increasingly cut corners and 
fail to follow established legal mandates 
and precedents. As a result, our chil-
dren suffer and their future is irrepara-
bly damaged. If advocates and attorneys 
undertake even a handful of school dis-
cipline hearings, school districts will be 
reminded not to ignore the law and deny 
students their constitutional rights.
50See cal. eDuc. coDe § 48916 (West 2006). New Hampshire, e.g., has no cap on expulsion periods. See N.h. Rev. Stat. 
aNN. § 193:13 (2006). Cf. oR. Rev. Stat. aNN § 339.250 (5) (West 2006) (students may not be expelled for more than one 
calendar year).
51See cal. eDuc. coDe § 48919 (West 2006).
52See id. § 48922.
53See 20 u.S.c. § 1415(k) (2006); Eileen L. Ordover, Disciplinary Exclusion of Students with Disabilities, 34 cleaRiNghouSe 
Review 50 (May–June 2000).
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